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Doubts about Moral Perception
Pekka Väyrynen
University of Leeds
Abstract: I  defend  doubts  about  the  existence  of  genuine  moral  perception,
understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents
of  perceptual  experience.  Standard  examples  of  moral  perception  are  better
explained as habitual implicit inferences or transitions in thought whose degree of
psychological  immediacy  varies  with  how  readily  non-evaluative  perceptual
inputs,  jointly  with  the  subject's  background  moral  beliefs,  training,  and
habituation, trigger the kinds of phenomenological responses that moral agents
are disposed to have when they represent things as being morally a certain way.
1. Introduction
Can moral properties – such as being wrong, or good, or unjust – be perceived, in any
robust sense? Many philosophers claim so.1 This paper will press doubts. 
It  is  tempting  to  count  perception  as  one  mode  of  access  to  at  least  some
instances of moral right and wrong, goodness and badness, and the like.2 We often
1 See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); David 
McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 57–59; Michael DePaul, Balance and 
Refinement (London: Routledge, 1993), 202–9; Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); John Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 231–48; Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley, 
'Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 
(2002), 75–85; Terence Cuneo, 'Reidian Moral Perception', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 
(2003), 229–58; Sarah McGrath, 'Moral Knowledge by Perception', Philosophical Perspectives 18 
(2004), 209–28; Jennifer Wright, 'The Role of Perception in Mature Moral Agency', in Moral 
Perception, ed. Jeremy J. Wisnewski (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 1–24; 
Timothy Chappell, 'Moral Perception', Philosophy 83 (2008), 421–37; Andrew Cullison, 'Moral 
Perception', European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010), 159–75; Jonathan Dancy, 'Moral 
Perception', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (2010), 99–117; Justin 
P. McBrayer,  'A Limited Defense of Moral Perception', Philosophical Studies 149 (2010), 305–20; 
Sabine Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Robert 
Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Robert Cowan, 'Perceptual 
Intuitionism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2015), 164–93; Preston J. Werner,  
'Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience', Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2016), 294–
317.
2 I'll focus on descriptively 'thin' evaluative properties, such as being good/bad, right/wrong, and 
just/unjust. Some defenders of moral perception pin their case on 'thick' evaluative properties such 
as kindness, cruelty, and selfishness. Dancy, for instance, writes: 'I can perceive its being her turn 
describe our moral experiences – experiences in which things strike us as being a
certain way morally – in apparently perceptual terminology. Consider: 
Cat:  'If  you  round  a  corner  and  see  a  group  of  young  hoodlums  pour
gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they
are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can  see
that it is wrong.'3 
Tiananmen Square: 'Could one not see terrible injustice by viewing soldiers
shooting citizens who are peaceably criticizing their government?'4 
But care is due. Sometimes 'see' designates a kind of intellectual understanding,
as when we say things like 'I see that P doesn't entail Q, but surely the truth of P
would be an unexplained accident unless Q were true'. And not all experiences
that  have a  phenomenal  character  which 'see'  may be used to  designate are
clearly perceptual; talk of 'seeing spots' might be an example. Even when 'see' is
used in a perceptual context, the mental state to which it is applied may not be a
case of perception. We can talk of a scientist 'seeing' a proton by seeing a vapor
trail  in a cloud chamber, but this doesn't  mean we can perceive protons.  So
although examples like Cat and Tiananmen Square can be felicitously described
as cases of 'seeing' something to be wrong, it doesn't follow that these moral
experiences involve  perceptual  representations of  moral  properties;  they may
merely be prompted by perceptual input. But as I'll discuss below, developments
in  the  philosophy  of  perception  provide  tools  for  assessing  whether  moral
perception occurs in any robust sense.5 
(my favourite example of a thick moral concept), the caring nature of a response, the 
courtesy or the rudeness of a gesture'; Dancy, op. cit. note 1, 114. This is an appealing move:
thick properties are more closely moored to properties that are agreed on all hands to be 
perceptible. But it is also a risky move: it is controversial whether thick terms and concepts 
are relevantly evaluative in content, and if they aren't, they won't determine evaluative 
properties as their referents. Perceiving something to be cruel, or kind, or selfish, wouldn't 
then be evaluative perception in the relevant sense. See Pekka Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude 
and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
I also suspect that the doubts I'll raise against the perception of thin evaluative properties can
also be run against thick evaluative properties; see note 35 below.
3 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 4.
4 Audi, op. cit. note 1, 31.
5 Other discussions of moral perception that are significantly informed by recent work in the 
philosophy of perception include Cowan, op. cit. note 1, and Werner, op. cit. note 1. 
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The  claim that  there  is  moral  perception might  be  found  attractive  on
different  grounds.  One  is  epistemological.  Assuming  we  have  some  moral
knowledge, how do we have it? Very many people think that if anything gives us
knowledge of the external world, perception does. So if moral properties were
something things could be perceived to have, this might help with the difficult
project of developing a plausible moral epistemology and integrating it with a
plausible  overall  epistemology.  The other  is  phenomenological:  certain moral
experiences might be best explained as perceptions of moral qualities. The two
motivations  are  logically  distinct.  Even  if  some  representations  of  moral
properties were best explained as genuinely perceptual, it would be a further
question whether this makes an independent contribution to a plausible moral
epistemology. (Conversely, the desired epistemological benefits might be secured
by some other modes of sensitivity to situations.6) But some moral experiences
must be perceptual for moral perception to provide epistemological benefits.
This paper aims to undermine the phenomenological motivation for moral
perception.  I'll  argue  that  cases  like  Cat  and  Tiananmen  Square  aren't best
explained as cases of moral perception even if we assume that  the contents of
perceptual experience aren't in general restricted to 'lower level' properties like
shape,  motion,  and  color.  Positing  distinctively  perceptual  representations  of
moral properties would add no explanatory power because a simpler and a more
unified account  treats  their  representations in the relevant  cases  as  resulting
instead from implicit  transitions in thought.  In  closing I'll  briefly  discuss  the
negative  implications  of  my  argument  for  the  epistemological  role  of  moral
perception. (I'll provide no separate argument that moral perception wouldn't be
an epistemologically independent source of knowledge or justification.)
6 A virtuous person has a better epistemic access to moral facts than someone faced with the 
same situation who lacks virtue. This sensitivity might be treated as a perceptual capacity: 
the virtuous person “sees” things that the non-virtuous doesn't; see e.g. Murdoch, op. cit. 
note 1, and John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', The Monist 62 (1979), 331–50. Separate 
discussions of whether it is a robustly perceptual capacity or how exactly a virtuous character
interacts with the contents of perceptual experience are beyond this paper's scope; the 
bearing of the discussion to follow on these issues will remain largely implicit. The same goes
for our experiences of certain actions as afforded or even mandated by our environment; for 
discussion, see Susanna Siegel, 'Affordances and the Contents of Perception', in Does 
Perception Have Content?, ed. Berit Brogaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 51–75.
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2. Moral Perception: Focusing the Issue
My argument will concern the following literal notion of moral perception: 
(MP) At least  some moral  properties can figure in the contents of
(veridical) perceptual experience.
Perceptual experience has phenomenal character: there is 'something it's like' to
have a perceptual experience. As stated, (MP) follows most recent discussions of
moral perception in assuming a representational theory of perception: roughly,
to have a perceptual experience of an object O as having a property F is to be in
a perceptual mental state (a state with phenomenal character) which has the
representational content that O is F. For simplicity, I'll assume that the relevant
kind  of  content  can  be  understood  as  a  kind  of  condition  under  which  the
experience which has such a content is accurate.7 
To focus discussion,  I'll  also  grant  two general  claims about perceptual
experience which have recently attracted considerable attention. The first is that
perceptual  experience  is  cognitively  penetrable.  This  is  to  say  that  what  one
perceives can be influenced, in a direct and non-trivial way, by the states of the
subject's cognitive system, such as moods, beliefs, and desires.8 
The second claim is that perceptual content can be  rich. Perception isn't
restricted to representing 'low level' properties, such as spatial properties, color,
shape, pitch, odor, motion, and illumination, which are perceived if anything is.
Some  other  properties  or  relations  can  also  be  represented  in perceptual
experience.9 This thesis has been defended for natural kind properties (such as
being a pine tree),  artifactual  kind properties (such as being a table),  causal
relations,  semantic  properties,  and  dispositional  properties  (such  as  being
7 This is how Siegel describes what she calls the 'Content View' of perceptual experience; see 
Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4, 
28–30. Below I'll grant what Siegel calls the 'Rich Content View' (ibid., 7, 97).
8 The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience is usefully surveyed in Dustin Stokes,  
'Cognitive Penetrability of Perception', Philosophy Compass 8 (2013), 646–63. See also 
Susanna Siegel, 'Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification', Noûs 46 (2012), 201–
22, and Jona Vance, 'Emotion and the New Epistemic Challenge from Cognitive 
Penetrability', Philosophical Studies 169 (2014), 257–83.
9 The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience and the richness of perceptual content 
are distinct issues; see Siegel, op. cit. note 7, 10. Perceptual content could be rich (or even 
feature moral properties in particular) even if the contents of perceptual experience weren't 
cognitive penetrable.  And perceptual content might be cognitive penetrable but not rich if 
cognitive states only influenced which low level properties figure in perceptual content. 
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edible),  among  others.  These  are  often  grouped  together  as  'high  level'
properties.  It  is  unclear  whether  this  is  to  be  understood  as  a  claim about
metaphysical  hierarchy:  odors  aren't  obviously  in  a  different  (and  more
fundamental) metaphysical boat than natural kinds, and semantic properties and
causal relations not obviously in the same. So perhaps a high level property is
supposed to be such that if it is perceived at all, perceptions of it depend on the
perception  of  other  (low  or  lower level)  properties.  Moral  properties  would
qualify as high level properties in this sense. (In fact, they would be higher level
relative to some other high level properties. The non-moral properties on which
moral properties depend will often include other high level properties, only some
of which will plausibly be perceptible if any are.)
These two assumptions will be helpful in two respects. First, they help to
distinguish doubts about (MP) which are relatively local to the moral case from
more general doubts about whether high level properties can be perceived. My
doubts  will  be  of  the  former  type.  Second,  the  two  assumptions  help  to
distinguish (MP) from neighboring views which accord perception some weaker
role in moral experience than (MP) does.10 When it comes to experiences like
Cat,  it  is one thing to say that an overall  mental  state that has a perceptual
experience as a component can also involve a representation of a moral property
as another component, quite another to say that the moral property figures in
the content of that perceptual experience. It seems to make sense to speak of 'the
overall  experience I'm having'  when,  surrounded by strange noises  in a dark
forest, I feel frightened, and to say my overall experience would be different if I
felt frightened and the forest were silent.11 The issue is how moral properties are
represented in certain overall experiences, not whether they are. 
Those who accept (MP) and those who reject it can agree that we often
perceive non-normative and non-evaluative properties on which moral and other
normative and evaluative properties depend for their instantiation. (I'll bracket a
host of complex issues concerning normative dependence.) The hoodlums can be
perceived  to  ignite  the  cat,  irrespective  of  whether  the  wrongness  that  is
grounded in their doing so also figures in the contents of our perceptions. Both
sides can also agree that perception can assist us in getting a clearer moral gauge
10 Many discussions of moral perception elide one or another of the distinctions that I draw in 
what follows, including the works cited in note 1 by McNaughton, DePaul, Greco, Watkins 
and Jolley, Cuneo, McGrath, Wright, Chappell, Dancy, and Cullison. 
11 I hope an example is enough. I don't have an account of experience individuation to deal 
with such fascinating but complicated phenomena as cross-modal integration and influence.  
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of things. It can, for instance, play a role in developing discriminative abilities
that  make  us  see  behaviors  that  in  no  way  alter  in  a  different  light  – as
refreshingly simple rather than unrefined, or spontaneous rather than lacking in
dignity.12
Both sides can agree that in cases where perception plays some important
role in informing us about events or states that bear moral properties, our overall
experience can include representation of moral properties. In Cat, for instance,
seeing the hoodlums ignite the cat and its striking you as wrong can belong to
the same overall  experience irrespective of  whether wrongness figures in the
contents of the perceptual experience that is part of the overall experience. Both
sides can further agree that the ability to represent moral properties on the basis
of perception is an acquired skill whose possession and exercise require training
and various sorts  of  background beliefs  and other  cognitive states.  And both
sides can agree that if representing something as being morally a certain way on
the basis of perceptual experience were a result of an inference or some other
transition in thought, such transitions needn't be conscious, but can be implicit.
Those who accept (MP) and those who reject it can also agree that moral
properties can make a phenomenological difference to overall mental states. If
what the hoodlums are doing in Cat didn't strike me as bad, then (all else equal)
my overall experience would feel different to me. I might flinch, but I wouldn't
have the kind of emotional or affective responses which psychologically normal
moral subjects tend to have in scenarios like Cat – responses such as indignation,
revulsion, disturbance, a felt disapproval, and affective empathy, as well as other
phenomenal responses like a sense of 'unfittingness'.13 No doubt many of these
responses can also co-occur. In this way moral properties can make a difference
to the phenomenology of the experience. In general, a property F can make a
phenomenological difference to an overall mental state S irrespective of whether
F figures in the contents of a perceptual experience that S has as a part. 
At  least  in  psychologically  normal  subjects,  moral  experiences  (things
striking a subject as being morally a certain way) seem closely bound up with
emotional or affective responses. We shouldn't assume that emotions themselves
12 Compare Murdoch, op. cit. note 1, 16–17.
13 Audi, op. cit. note 1, mentions all of these states in discussing moral perception. Audi doesn't 
endorse (MP), however. He only claims that we perceive moral properties by perceiving the 
non-moral properties that ground their instantiations. For discussion, see Antti Kauppinen's 
review of Audi, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.06.29 
(https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40724-moral-perception/). 
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are a kind of perception.14 But both the proponents and the opponents of (MP)
can allow two weaker claims about how emotional and affective responses relate
to the overall mental states in question.
The first claim is that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions (for
indignation, revulsion, disturbance, felt disapproval, affective empathy, and the
like) are normally shaped in part by the same background moral beliefs which
presumably also play a role in representations of moral properties. It is in part
because  I  believe  that  causing  seemingly  gratuitous  suffering  to  sentient
creatures is normally wrong that I'm disposed both to be disturbed and repulsed
when I  see what the hoodlums are doing and to represent their  behavior as
wrong. (One simple model would portray the relevant background moral belief
as a moral principle which tends to get engaged in cognitive processing when
non-moral perceptual input matches the non-moral condition laid down by the
principle.15) If my background moral views were different, my dispositions to be
disturbed and repulsed would also tend to be different, at least in the conditions
that  trigger  them.  So  even  if  my  having  some  or  other relevant  emotional
dispositions  doesn't  depend  on  my  particular  background  moral  beliefs,  just
which such dispositions I have depends in part on the influence of those beliefs.16
The  second  claim  is  that  our  phenomenological  responses  tend  to  be
'phenomenally integrated' with our perceptions of the non-evaluative features of
the  situation.17 Once  I  take  in  that  the  hoodlums  are  igniting  a  cat,  my
perception of what they are doing, my repulsion by their act, and its striking me
as wrong won't normally seem like distinct co-occurring experiences. (It won't be
like seeing Rio de Janeiro and visually imagining myself hang gliding above it.)
The various responses we tend to have in cases like Cat normally seem like one
fairly seamless overall experience. 
14 For criticisms of the 'perceptual model' of emotional experience, see Michael S. Brady, 
Emotional Insight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
15 I mention this model just for illustration; options where the background beliefs aren't general
principles remain less clear. Note that a background moral principle can play a role in my 
coming to represent what the hoodlums are doing as wrong even if it isn't exceptionless 
(contra McGrath, op. cit. note 1, 217–20). A moral principle can also influence one's 
recognitions of moral properties in other ways than by functioning as a premise in inferences 
from non-moral inputs to moral beliefs; compare Pekka Väyrynen, 'Usable Moral Principles', 
in Challenging Moral Particularism, ed. Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko 
Strahovnik (London: Routledge, 2008), 75–106. 
16 Thanks to Preston Werner for comments that helped to make this paragraph more precise.
17 I borrow the phrase 'phenomenal integration' from Audi, op. cit. note 1, 38–9. It isn't fully 
clear how Audi understands the phrase. The main text provides the sense in which I'll use it. 
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The extent of the common ground between those who accept (MP) and
those  who reject  it  helps  us  to  identify  what  is  at  issue  between them.  The
distinction between overall experiences and the perceptual experiences they may
have  as  parts,  for  instance,  enables  each  side  to  allow  that  'such  ordinary
perceptions as  seeing a  violent  seizure of  an old man's  wallet  or hearing an
abusive vulgarity screamed at a conference speaker' can have some such moral
element as 'a phenomenal sense of wrongdoing integrated with our perceptual
representation of the wrong-making facts'.18 (MP) advances a claim about where
the representation of moral properties is properly located in the relevant overall
experiences – namely, in the contents of perceptual experiences they have as
parts. The version of (MP) on which I'll  focus here says that there are some
mechanism(s)  of  cognitive  penetration  (CP)  which  enrich  the  contents  of
perceptual experience with moral properties. There may be other mechanisms
capable of making (MP) true.19 But this version of (MP) is of double interest: it
promises to contribute to a plausible moral epistemology and it provides a test
case  for  how  widely  the  most  prominent  current  argument  for  high  level
perceptual content generalizes. 
The  foregoing  suggests  one  possible  mechanism  of  the  requisite  kind.
Background moral beliefs might help to enrich perceptual content with moral
properties owing to CP facilitated by the emotional and affective dispositions
they shape.20 This would explain not only why certain emotional or affective
responses go reliably with certain moral representations, but also why both seem
18 Audi, op. cit. note 1, 44–5.
19 Perhaps moral representations are hard-wired into our perceptual system. Or perhaps (MP) is
made true by perceptual learning without a robust CP-type influence of background states 
with moral content. Neither proposal strikes me as particularly promising. 
20 Both Cowan, op. cit. note 1, and Werner, op. cit. note 1, suggest this kind of possibility. 
Cowan (77–79) also describes various possible mechanisms of CP for the moral case. One 
direct model is that a cognitive state like an emotional experience is triggered directly by 
perceptual input and then cognitively penetrates perceptual experience, adding moral 
properties to its content. (I'll bracket the possibility that background moral beliefs themselves
somehow directly penetrate perceptual content. It is unclear how this model is supposed to 
work or to ground the kind of 'phenomenal contrast' argument for (MP) that I'll discuss in 
section 3 below.) One indirect model is that perceptual input first 'matches' memory 
representations of badness and this matching process leads to the formation of a cognitive 
state like an emotional experience that cognitively penetrates perceptual experience, adding 
moral properties to its content. Note that rival views to (MP) can adopt similar models short 
of adding moral properties into perceptual content. (For instance, a matching process can 
make a phenomenological difference to one's overall experience either way.)
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seamlessly integrated with the perceptual inputs that activate them. 
The appeal  to  CP also helps  this  interpretation of  (MP) not  to  portray
moral perception as a function of a special 'faculty' or sensory modality. All sides
can  agree  that  if  moral  properties  figured  in  the  contents  of  perceptual
experience, they would have to do so in a different way from colors, shapes, and
other low level properties information about which is carried by a distinctive
sensory modality. Moral perception would be 'amodal' in the same kind of way
as perception of many other higher level properties.21 In the moral case, then, CP
would be better regarded as adding content to a framework provided by non-
moral perceptual representations than as altering those representations.22
This, at any rate, is the kind of account of moral perception against which
I'll press doubts below.23 I'll argue that certain things which any account of the
role of perception in moral cognition should be able to explain don't seem to be
best explained by (MP). To make the case concrete, I'll sketch a rival explanation
that is at least as powerful as (MP) but simpler and more unified. The view I'll
sketch treats the representation of moral properties in the standard examples of
moral  experience  as  resulting  from  transitions  in  thought  whose  degree  of
psychological explicitness or implicitness can vary with how habituated they are
and  how  tightly  bound  up  they  are  with  the  relevant  phenomenological
responses.  But  we won't  have  reason  to  take  these  transitions  to  enrich  the
contents  of  perceptual  experience.  Positing  distinctively  perceptual
21 This kind of parallel between moral properties and some other higher level properties is 
drawn in the works cited in note 1 by DePaul, Greco, Watkins and Jolley, McGrath, Chappell,
Cullison, McBrayer, Cowan, and Werner.
22 Most proponents of (MP) suppose that perception of moral properties somehow depends on 
perception of non-moral properties. It is less clear how exactly to cash out this assumption. 
The constellations of non-moral properties on which moral properties depend are typically 
very complex and some of the relevant base properties (including various complex social and
historical phenomena) plausibly don't themselves figure in the contents of perceptual 
experience. If we perceive moral properties by perceiving their non-moral grounds but not all
parts of such grounds are themselves perceivable, what would this imply regarding (MP)? 
Worries might arise if, for instance, instantiations of moral properties were perceivable by 
perceiving their non-moral grounds only if the latter metaphysically necessitated or 
determined the former. Audi supposes something like this, but he underestimates the 
complexity of non-moral grounds that will follow; see Audi, op. cit. note 1, 58-60, 108. The 
non-moral grounds of moral properties might thus be too complex for moral properties to be 
perceived on the basis of perceiving the perceivable parts of their grounds. 
23 I detect this kind of account, or at least significant strands of it, in Cowan, op. cit. note 1, and
Werner, op. cit. note 1. Audi, op. cit. note 1, is a less clear case; his view allows but doesn't 
require the possibility of rich perceptual contents effected by mechanisms of CP.
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representations of moral properties would add no explanatory power.24 
3. The Method of Phenomenal Contrast
How might one try to argue for (MP)? Philosophers who accept (MP) often just
defend  it  against  objections  instead  of  giving  a  positive  argument.25 But  we
might adapt positive arguments from philosophy of perception to the moral case.
Arguments for high level perceptual content often deploy the  method of
phenomenal contrast.26 I'm happy to grant the general method.27 It begins with a
description  of  two  overall  mental  states  each  of  which  has  a  perceptual
experience as a part. The description is supposed to elicit the intuition that the
overall mental states differ in their phenomenology but not in the lower level
properties represented by the perceptual experiences. The claim that one but not
the  other  of  these  perceptual  experiences  involves  a  particular  high  level
property (being a pine tree, one event causing another, or whatever) as part of
its content will be warranted if it best explains why the mental states differ in
their phenomenology. For instance, the claim that we can visually experience the
property of being a pine tree might be defended as the best explanation of the
kind of phenomenological difference that characterizes your experiences of pine
trees before and after you develop a disposition to recognize pine trees.
To  assess  whether  the  method of  phenomenal  contrast can be  used to
provide  a  positive  argument  for  (MP),  we  require  a  suitable  target  moral
experience and a phenomenologically  contrasting experience.  A contrast  case
that involves no moral representation at all would be too dissimilar from the
target experience to provide a good test case for (MP). Further, subjects with
24 More issues arise here than I can address in what follows, many of them concerning 
perception in general. For instance, perhaps there is no determinate fact as to whether some 
higher level property figures in the contents of perceptual experience; compare Heather 
Logue, 'Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter?', 
Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), 1–12. The discussion to follow concerns what to say about 
(MP) presuming the issue isn't indeterminate.
25 Examples of the defensive strategy include Cullison, op. cit. note 1, and McBrayer, op. cit. 
note 1. Werner, op. cit. note 1, offers a positive argument for (MP); see note 28 below.
26 For this strategy, see especially Siegel, op. cit. note 7, chs. 4–5, and 'Which Properties are 
Represented in Perception?', in Perceptual Experience, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John 
Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 481–503. My presentation of the 
method of phenomenal contrast has benefited also from Logue, op. cit. note 24. 
27 For various complications that I cannot discuss regarding the relationship between the 
phenomenal contents of experiences and putative higher level contents, see Nicholas Silins, 
'The Significance of High Level Content', Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), 13–33. 
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notably  different  background  moral  beliefs  will  respond  differently  in  many
particular cases, but for reasons that are orthogonal to (MP). Recall, however,
that both sides can agree that representing something as wrong, or bad, on the
basis of non-moral perceptual input tends to be intimately bound up with certain
emotional or affective responses at least in psychologically normal subjects. A
contrast argument for (MP) might then appeal to phenomenological differences
between normal  subjects  and subjects  who share their  moral  perspective but
suffer from affective deficit disorder, such as inability to feel affective empathy
for  a  subject  of  distress  while  understanding from behavioral  and contextual
clues that the subject is in distress.28
Thus consider Norma and Alex who both witness a scenario like Cat. Their
non-moral perceptual inputs (whether low or high level) and spatial attention
are the same. What the hoodlums are doing strikes Norma as bad and she also
has  the  sorts  of  phenomenological  responses  to  the  scenario  which
psychologically normal subjects (with a capacity for affective empathy and so
on) tend to have. Alex also represents what the hoodlums are doing as bad. For
he is  capable of  recognizing the cat's  distress on the basis  of  behavioral  and
auditory cues, and he can learn and apply moral norms. But Alex lacks the sort
of phenomenological responses (affective empathy, revulsion, and so on) which
Norma experiences. Nor is his representation of what the hoodlums are doing as
bad psychologically immediate; he needs to 'figure it out'. So Norma's and Alex's
overall experiences differ in their phenomenology. (I'll sometimes refer to this
contrast as 'Norma/Alex'.) The question for those who advance a phenomenal
contrast argument for (MP) is  whether this contrast is  best explained by the
hypothesis that some such property as being (morally) bad figures in the content
of Norma's percepetual experience but not Alex's.
(MP) offers a prima facie plausible explanation of the Norma/Alex contrast.
(A) Norma's disposition to have the type of experience she has in response to Cat
can more or less reliably track badness.29 (B) Nor would Norma easily have the
28 After first devising the sort of contrast pair that follows in the text, I discovered that Werner, 
op. cit. note 1, gives a similar contrast argument for (MP) from phenomenological 
differences between 'emotionally empathic dysfunctional individuals' and normally 
functioning human adults. My presentation here adapts some features of Werner's argument.
His argument is more subtle than mine – but not, I think, in ways that affect what I want to 
say. Finally, we both appeal to cases of interpersonal contrast. I agree with Werner that clean
intrapersonal cases of phenomenologically differing moral experiences are hard to come by.
29 I'll pass over the complication that different moral properties can prompt the same response, 
such as indignation or outrage in the case of both wrongness and injustice. 
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phenomenological responses in question if what the hoodlums are doing weren't
bad; this counterfactual connection can hold at least locally, across the sorts of
circumstances Norma is likely to encounter. (C) Norma is also disposed to form
moral beliefs (such as that the cat's suffering is bad) based on experiences of this
type, and much more spontaneously so than Alex. States that meet conditions
like (A)-(C) seem plausible candidates for states that represent some property F,
in  this  case  (moral)  badness.30 Although  the  phenomenological  difference
between  Norma  and  Alex  is  emotional  or  affective  in  some  sense,  it  might
nonetheless make a difference to the contents of perceptual experience owing to
some suitable mechanism of CP.
But is this the best explanation of the phenomenal contrast between Norma
and Alex? I want to press doubts by pointing to some respects in which this
explanation is problematic or inferior to a rival explanation which I'll sketch.
One immediate worry about the above contrast argument for (MP) is that
it threatens to show too much. The distinction between an overall mental state
and a perceptual experience that it has as a part implies that Norma's overall
mental state can meet conditions like (A)-(C) even if her representation of what
the hoodlums are doing as bad doesn't figure in the contents of the perceptual
experience that is a part of it. Consider a case from physics that mimics Cat:
Proton: When Marie, a trained physicist, sees a trail of vapor bubbles in the
cloud chamber, she doesn't need to figure anything out, she can just  see
that a proton is going by.
Its striking Marie that a proton just passed can meet conditions (A)-(C). Her
disposition to have this experience can reliably track the presence of protons. It
is a disposition she has developed in the course of her training and practice as an
experimental  physicist.  This  disposition  can  have  a  relevantly  associated
phenomenology.  Marie's  overall  mental  state  can  include  aspects  such  as  a
feeling  of  conviction,  and  it  is  psychologically  immediate  in  a  way  that  it
wouldn't be if Marie were an untrained physicist who needs to reason her way
from a visual experience of a trail of vapor bubbles and the physical theory to
the  presence  of  a  proton.  Owing  to  how  tightly  these  phenomenological
responses can (given suitable scientific training and practice) become bound up
with  observing  vapor  trails  in  a  cloud  chamber,  the  responses  can  also  be
30 Werner, op. cit. note 1, uses reasoning like this in taking Norma's case to support (MP).
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counterfactually correlated with the presence of protons, at least locally. Marie is
also disposed to form beliefs about protons passing based on experiences of this
type, and more spontaneously so than if she were untrained.31 
It  doesn't  follow  from  (A)-(C)  that  the  phenomenological  difference
between  the  trained  and  untrained  response  is  better  explained  by  the
hypothesis  that  protons  figure  in  the  contents  of  the  trained  Marie's  visual
experiences  than  by  the  hypothesis  that  her  response  is  a  kind  of  trained
judgment  or  transition  in  thought.  The  point  isn't  that  you  cannot  see
unobservables. Seeing an F is different from having a visual experience with the
content that there is an F. Even so, there had better be some limits on what
properties can figure in true instances of 'It visually seems to S that there is an F'.
Marie's reports aren't a reliable guide to these limits, since what one is trained to
say upon having certain experiences ('I see a proton'; 'That's a proton passing') is
one thing, the content of those experiences is another. So granting (A)-(C) in
Proton leaves it open whether Marie visually represents a proton passing. It gives
no compelling  reason to  deny  that  Marie's  psychologically  immediate  proton
representation  is  anything  other  than  trained  scientific  judgment  operating
habitually.32 By  parity,  then,  it  remains  far  from  clear  that  method  of
phenomenal contrast supports (MP) in cases like Norma/Alex. At the very least,
no explanatory schema that we apply to Norma/Alex should straight away imply
that we can visually experience protons; that should remain a further issue.
So the question remains: where in the relevant moral experiences is the
representation of moral properties best located – the perceptual experiences they
have as parts or some other part of the overall mental state? And the question
remains: what sorts of considerations would break the issue one way or another?
4. Three Points Against (MP)
I'll now raise three related points against the claim that the phenomenological
differences between subjects like Norma and Alex are best explained by (MP).
They'll  count  as  points  of  criticism given  the  standard  theoretical  virtues  of
simplicity,  unity,  and  explanatory  power.  (One  explanation  is  better  than
31 These points chime well with the view of scientific 'intuitions' as a species of trained 
judgment. See Richard Boyd, How To Be a Moral Realist', in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 181–228. 
32 I confess to not being moved by the tentative defense of 'the possibility of the phenomenal 
representation of protons in perceptual experience' in Cowan, op. cit. note 1. Delicate issues 
arise here concerning the relation between perceptual experience and perception. 
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another, all else equal, if it is simpler, and likewise for the other virtues.) The
cumulative upshot of these points is that there is a rival model that seems to be
able to explain everything that (MP) explains but is simpler and, at least by one
relevant measure, more unified.
Comparing rival explanations against multiple criteria can get tricky.33 In
the  present  context,  for  instance,  positing  distinctively  perceptual
representations of moral properties doesn't automatically make the account less
simple.  Perhaps  each  rival  must  posit  some  other distinctive  psychological
mechanism.  But  if  a  rival  explanation  can  instead  appeal  to  some  general
mechanism that  we need to  recognize  anyway,  independently  of  the  role  of
perception in moral experience, this is a reason to consider the rival explanation
simpler, and possibly more unified. This would make it superior, at least if it also
explains at least as much as (MP). 
My  first  critical  point  builds  on  points  made  earlier.  When  what  the
hoodlums  are  doing  in  Cat  strikes  me  as  bad,  this  representation  depends
somehow on my having certain background cognitive states with moral content.
I'm taking (MP) to say that these background states cognitively penetrate the
contents  of  my  perceptual  experience.  But  cases  like  Proton suggest  an
alternative  model.  The  alternative  I'll  adopt  in  order  to  facilitate  concrete
comparisons is that when Norma sees what the hoodlums are doing in Cat and
represents  it  as  bad,  this  representation  results  from  an  implicit  habitual
inference  or  some other  type  of  transition  in  thought  which  can  be  reliably
prompted  by  the  non-moral  perceptual  inputs  jointly  with  the  relevant
background moral  beliefs.34 (Perhaps  the  badness  of  what  the  hoodlums are
doing fits Norma's perceptual evidence and has a high prior probability given her
background moral beliefs.) The transition can also be psychologically immediate
and bound up with the relevant emotional or affective responses, explaining how
things can 'strike'  us as being morally a certain way.35 Sometimes those who
33 Thanks to Susanna Siegel for pressing me to clarify my methodological assumptions.
34 Robert Cowan suggested to me that this account might overgeneralize to exclude many high 
level properties whose relation to perceptual content I want to leave open. But whether some
higher level property can be perceived needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The rival 
explanation that I run for moral properties carries no automatic commitment regarding 
causal relations, kind properties, or semantic properties. (Apparent differences include the 
way in which emotional or affective responses are involved.) If a rival explanation along 
those lines is the best (or not, for that matter) for some other higher level properties, so be it.
35 This account of Norma's experience seems structurally parallel to how Marie's experience in 
Proton is bound up with phenomenological responses shaped by her training. Note that a 
14
defend (MP) tend to contrast it with views that involve a very narrow notion of
inference. It is therefore worth noting that we can reasonably speak of inference
in a broader sense even when someone doesn't explicitly represent the premises
or cannot articulate them.36 Alternatively the relevant transition might be more
like a recognition based on taking in a pattern one isn't able to articulate, where
what  pattern  gets  recognized  may  be  influenced  by  prior  training  and
background cognitive states.37 
The foregoing is a sketch, but the basic explanatory schema is hopefully
clear enough. There are many ways to model the relevant kind of transitions
more precisely. One picture is that non-moral perceptual input triggers (directly
or indirectly) certain emotional or affective dispositions which have been shaped
by background moral beliefs and whose manifestations are intimately causally
bound up with representing things as being morally a certain way.38
My critical point is twofold. First, there is a principled model for explaining
how Norma's  representation of  what  the hoodlums are  doing  as  bad can be
phenomenally integrated (owing to related emotional and affective dispositions)
with her non-moral perceptions without cognitively penetrating the contents of
perceptual experience. Second, the model appeals to no psychological states or
mechanisms that we don't need to recognize anyway. My outline only appeals to
inferences  and  other  reliable  transitions  in  thought  and  to  emotional  and
affective dispositions. This explanation of cases like Norma/Alex thus promises
to be simpler than (MP). 
My  second  point  builds  on  the  first.  Cases  like  Proton  aren't  the  only
instructive  parallel  for  Cat.  Representations  of  some  non-moral  evaluative
properties  seem to  parallel  moral  properties  but  are  more  plausibly  located
outside the perceptual components of overall experiences. Consider:
similar account can be run for variants of Norma/Alex where the target property isn't a thin 
evaluative property such as being bad but a thick property such as being cruel; recall note 2. 
36 Nicholas Sturgeon offers epistemological motivations for a broad notion of inference which 
applies to 'cases in which someone is unable to articulate the premises, and also to cases in 
which someone is unconscious of making an inference and perhaps even of accepting the 
premises'; Sturgeon, 'Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism', in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-
evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 184–211, at 209. Note
that inference so understood remains a process at the personal rather than subpersonal level.
37 Emotions and affects can work like this. For instance, one might be afraid (or find the used 
car salesman untrustworthy) without being able to put one's finger on what is wrong. Pattern
recognition is discussed in the context of moral perception also by Chappell, op. cit. note 1.
38 Compare the various direct and indirect models of CP described in note 20 above.
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Fine Wine: Greg, an experienced wine maker, reports that when he samples
wine he perceives it as having various non-evaluative qualities which form
his basis for classifying it as fine or not. Michael, a wine connoisseur, says
that he can taste also fineness in wine.39 
Greg's and Michael's experiences can also differ phenomenologically, such as in
the immediacy of their felt satisfaction in tasting a fine wine and its phenomenal
integration  with  the  relevant  non-evaluative  inputs.  Given  the  reported
differences, what would warrant attributing the property of being a fine wine to
the content of some of Michael's perceptual experiences but not those of Greg's? 
Greg and Michael both can recognize fine wine. But I see no good reason
to  suppose  that  Michael  has  some  training,  background  knowledge,  or
discriminative  ability  which  Greg  lacks.  According  to  the  rival  explanation
sketched  above,  their  overall  mental  states  involve  the  same  kinds  of  prior
expectations,  beliefs,  training,  and  dispositions  to  form  certain  evaluative
classifications in response to certain non-evaluative perceptual inputs. A realistic
example of this sort will add that sometimes Greg's response is more immediate
than his typical response, and Michael's less so. This suggests more forcefully still
that their responses differ primarily in degree: in how psychologically immediate
their responses tend to be and how integrated the non-evaluative inputs tend to
be with the feelings of satisfaction that tasting a fine wine tends to produce.40 I
take this to increase the plausibility of supposing that Greg and Michael share
the  same  discriminative  abilities.  On  this  rival  account  of  Fine  Wine, such
representations are even in  Michael's  case  at  least  as  plausibly  an upshot  of
inferences or some other reliable transitions in thought as they are distinctively
perceptual. This parallels my suggested account of the Norma/Alex contrast.
My  third  point  is  that  moral  properties  can  get  represented  in  moral
experience on the basis of diverse kinds of input. In vivid moral experiences the
39 I first used this (real life) example in Pekka Väyrynen, 'Some Good and Bad News for Ethical 
Intuitionism', Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 489–511, at 499. 
40 Two further points. First, as with 'see', so with 'taste': even if Michael doesn't need to stop to 
figure out that a wine is fine, it doesn't follow that the property of being a fine wine figures 
in the contents of his perceptual experience. Second, parallel reasoning in the intrapersonal 
variant of Fine Wine suggests that the phenomenological differences between Michael now 
and in the previous stage of his training aren't explained better as a difference in what 
properties he perceives than as a difference in the psychological immediacy and phenomenal 
integration of the same kind of transition in thought.
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inputs often are perceptual. Consider not only  Cat and  Tiananmen Square but
also  seeing  a  hit-and-run,  seeing  one  person  push  another  off  a  footbridge,
observing a street child living in abject poverty, hearing thuds and cries from a
dark  alley,  or  (recall  Audi's  example)  hearing  someone  scream  abuse  at  a
conference speaker.41 Many of us would represent what we are perceiving in
such  cases  as  wrong  or  bad,  and  our  non-moral  perceptual  inputs  would
normally be integrated with certain phenomenological responses. But we seem
to exercise  the same kind of  ability  when the street  child's  circumstances as
documented in a photograph strike us as bad and evoke affective empathy. And
we seem disposed to respond in the same kind of way also when we imagine
rather than perceive the thuds and the cries or the hit-and-run, or come to know
about the abusive vulgarity or the footbridge incident by description rather than
acquaintance.42 
These different types of moral experience can of course differ in degree,
such as with respect to how reliably they trigger the associated phenomenology
and  how  vivid  they  are.43 But  they  seem  all  to  involve  the  same  kind of
representational ability. At the very least we have yet to see good reasons to
individuate the relevant abilities to represent moral properties so narrowly that
we have one ability for 'vivid' perceptual cases like Cat and another for others.
Explaining these moral experiences seems to require only a general capacity to
represent  moral  properties  which  is  responsive  to  inputs  from  perception,
imagination,  supposition,  and  belief,  and  which  can  be  psychologically
immediate at least when those inputs are reliably and closely bound up with
certain emotional and affective dispositions.44 
The point isn't just that positing a distinctively perceptual representational
ability adds no explanatory power with respect to cases like Cat and Tiananmen
41 Note that this model doesn't presuppose that F cannot figure in the contents of one's 
perceptual experience if one cannot discriminate Fs from not-Fs (e.g. stabbings that are bad 
from behaviorally identical stabbings that aren't). The relevance of counterfactual conditions 
to perceptual representation and knowledge is discussed in Cowan, op. cit. note 1, 183–7.
42 Inputs from imagination can be diverse in further ways. They may involve either mental 
imagery (the kind of quasi-perceptual process we engage in when, for instance, we close our 
eyes and imagine seeing something 'in the mind's eye') or propositional imagining.
43 Many philosophers are no doubt desensitized to descriptions of people being pushed off 
bridges, owing to the ubiquity of such cases in the trolley problem literature.
44 Robert Cowan suggested to me that this picture implies a disanalogy with aesthetic 
experience. It isn't clear that we can exercise aesthetic discriminative abilities in response to 
imagination or testimony in the way we can in response to perception. That may be right, but
it remains unclear how this disanalogy would bear on (MP) until its source is clarified.
17
Square. (That was the lesson I took from Fine Wine.) It is also that explaining
moral  experiences  that  are  based  on  non-perceptual  inputs  would  require
positing some distinct representational abilities. The rival to (MP) which I have
put  on  the  table  explains  a  wider  range  of  cases  by  appeal  to  one  general
representational mechanism. In this respect it offers a simpler and more unified
account of moral experience than alternative packages built around (MP). 
This claim is further strengthened when we note that (MP) involves an
additional commitment that the parallel claims about many other higher level
properties don't. If we perceive what the hoodlums are doing as wrong in Cat,
we do so in part by perceiving the cat's distress. If we perceive the shooting of
the citizens in Tiananmen Square to be unjust, we do so in part by perceiving the
citizens as peaceably criticizing their government. These non-moral properties,
though lower level relative to moral properties, are still  high level. In typical
arguments for high level content, perceptual content gets cognitively penetrated
once  over:  background  cognitive  states  influence  perceptual  experience  by
adding high level properties to a framework provided by low level properties.
But  at  least  in  some  cases  (MP)  would  imply  that  perceptual  content  is
cognitively  penetrated twice over:  first  in the typical  way,  then by a further
addition of moral properties to a framework provided by non-moral high and
low level properties.45 The parallel that many discussions of moral perception
draw between moral properties and other higher level properties therefore looks
exaggerated.46 (MP) requires a more complex picture than such cases of high
level perceptual content as causal relations and kind properties.47
45 Robert Cowan suggested to me that one might think instead that if one is presented with a 
non-moral perception of lower level properties involved in (say) Tiananmen Square, CP will 
involve the activation of a cluster of beliefs and dispositions associated with peaceful 
criticism, injustice, and so on, which then cognitively penetrate the perceptual experience 
together, only once over. But I see no principled reason to think this is the only way moral 
perception could occur if (MP) were true. 
46 I have in mind the works cited in note 1 by Greco, Watkins and Jolley, Chappell, Cullison, 
and McBrayer. For a yet further complication, consider the emotional and affective 
dispositions manifested in the sorts of overall mental states that generate the phenomenal 
contrast argument for (MP) are shaped by background moral beliefs. Are these emotional 
and affective experiences themselves cognitively penetrable? If yes, this may require a yet 
further layer of CP. The cognitive penetrability of emotional experience is discussed e.g. in 
Vance, op. cit. note 8. 
47 This point bears also on the relationship between perceptual experience and perception in 
the moral case. Even if (MP) were true, the double-layered CP structure might mean that the 
relevant perceptual experiences fail to be sufficiently directly related to the moral properties 
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In sum: There is  a principled model of  the role of perception in moral
experience on which moral properties don't figure in the contents of perceptual
experience. It treats the examples that are meant to make (MP) attractive as
special cases of a more general and unified account of moral experience. As a
simpler explanation of those cases, the model is preferable to (MP). 
5. Two Objections
I'll now consider two objections to my argument against (MP) so far. The first
objection  is  that  the  rival  explanatory  schema  I  have  sketched  carries  some
further commitments that make it no more unified or simple than (MP).  The
second is that some features of moral experience cannot be adequately explained
without positing distinctively perceptual representations of moral properties. 
One way to press the first objection is to claim that my rival explanation
carries  a  commitment  to  'cognitive  phenomenology'  which  (MP)  avoids.  To
acknowledge  cognitive  phenomenology  is  to  acknowledge  that  propositional
attitudes  (believing,  desiring,  hoping,  etc.)  constitutively  involve  phenomenal
character or 'what-it-is-likeness'.48 Interpreting this worry isn't straightforward.
My account of the phenomenological difference between Norma and Alex in Cat
requires no particular belief or desire which Norma has but Alex doesn't. 
Perhaps the worry is that what it is like for Alex to represent what the
hoodlums  are  doing  as  bad differs  from what  that  is  like  for  Norma:  Alex's
experience  involves  a  conscious  inference  but  Norma's  doesn't,  and this  is  a
difference in cognitive phenomenology. But this worry also fails to bite. On the
explanation that I propose, both Norma and Alex come to represent what the
hoodlums are doing as bad by an inference or some other kind of transition in
thought. In Alex's case the phenomenological manifestation of the transition is
'figuring  things  out'.49 In  Norma's  case  the  transition  is  phenomenologically
reflected  by  certain  affective  states.  In  each  case  the  transition  needs  to  be
involved in the relevant phenomenology only causally, not constitutively. 
that they represent to count as moral perception. (Compare the discussion in Cowan, op. cit. 
note 1, 182–3.)
48 See e.g. Terence Horgan and John Tienson, 'The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenology of Intentionality', in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, ed. David J. Chalmers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 520–32.
49 Nor do I need to suppose that what Alex's experience is like to him is a constitutive feature of
making an inference rather than a phenomenal state that may be causally related to making 
an inference. Here consider e.g. the broad notion of inference in Sturgeon, op. cit. note 36.
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The rival explanation to (MP) that I propose for these cases also doesn't
require  any  phenomenology  that  we  don't  need  to  recognize  anyway.  The
phenomenal  contrast  argument  for  (MP)  outlined  in  section  3  is  equally
committed to whatever phenomenal character are possessed by the emotional
and affective  states  invoked  in  Norma's  case  and the  experience  of  'figuring
things out' invoked in Alex's case. The version of (MP) that strikes me as the
most  promising says that  at  least  in some subjects,  perceptual  input  triggers
(directly or indirectly) an emotional or affective response owing to which some
relevant  moral  background  beliefs  which  have  shaped  those  responses
cognitively penetrate perceptual experience, adding some moral property to its
content. The rival explanation that I propose treats those responses as reflecting
an implicit habituated transition in thought from a perceptual input to a moral
representation,  owing  to  the  way  that  the  relevant  emotional  and  affective
dispositions have been shaped by some relevant background moral beliefs which
connect non-moral inputs with moral classifications. Each view thus agrees that
background moral beliefs can cognitively penetrate some or other aspect of the
overall mental state of which a perceptual experience is a part. Each view also
treats the capacity to represent moral properties as an acquired capacity that
requires suitable training and background moral beliefs. My argument has been
that treating this capacity as a perceptual capacity adds no explanatory power. 
Characterizations of CP tend to be too weak to discriminate between these
rival  explanations.  To  say  that  a  perceptual  experience  E  is  cognitively
penetrated by a  background belief, desire, or other cognitive state  C is to say
that  the phenomenal character of  E depends non-trivially on C. The relevant
relation of dependence looks to be some suitably internal and mental relation of
causal dependence. Now suppose we understand this relation counterfactually: if
C didn't occur (antecedent to E), then E wouldn't occur.50 This characterization is
too  weak  to  distinguish,  at  least  in  some  cases,  between  the  claim  that  C
penetrates  the  content  of  the  perceptual  experience  E  and  the  claim that  C
somehow or other penetrates the overall mental state of which E is a part.51 On
the  rival  explanatory  schema,  the  relevant  background  moral  beliefs,  the
emotional  and  affective  dispositions  they  shape,  and  non-moral  perceptual
inputs can stand in suitably internal and mental (indeed, contentual) relations
that satisfy the counterfactual. Norma wouldn't have the emotional and affective
50 See e.g. Stokes, op. cit. note 8, whose survey of CP I'm following here.
51 To my knowledge, this problem hasn't been noted in the literature on CP.
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responses she has to cases like  Cat if  her non-moral perceptual inputs  didn't
engage her background moral beliefs.52 The first objection to my argument fails.
The second objection is that not everything about moral experience that
needs  explanation  can  be  explained  without  positing  distinctively  perceptual
representations of  moral  properties.  In  particular,  one might  claim that  only
(MP) can explain cases where something continues to strike the subject as bad or
wrong in spite of stable background beliefs to the effect that it is neither. 
One notable feature of perceptual representations is that they are highly
insensitive to  conflicting background beliefs.  For  instance,  in the Müller-Lyer
illusion one line is experienced as being longer than the other. Whatever other
adjustments  the background knowledge that the lines are really  of  the same
length  might  effect  in  my  cognitive  system,  it  won't  change  my  perceptual
phenomenology. The same is true of certain perceptual illusions, such as the
horse illusion (Figure 1), where no sense modality carries all of the information
that gets represented in the experience.
Figure 1 The horse illusion
I cannot help seeing the black box as occluding the midsection of one very long
horse, although I firmly believe, on the basis of all the other horse contours, that
I should complete the occluded part of the picture with the front half of the
horse on the left and the rear half of the horse on the right.  We cannot help
perceptually  completing  the  occluded  parts  of  objects  in  the  simplest  way
possible, even if  we have some conflicting firm beliefs about how we should
52 Again one simple model of how perceptual input can 'engage' background moral beliefs in 
cognitive processing is that it matches the antecedent of a background moral principle. 
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complete them.53 If we completed this shape by forming a non-perceptual belief
that the occluded shape is such and such, our completion shouldn't be insensitive
to our other beliefs in the way it is.54 
To defend (MP) on the grounds that moral  experiences in the putative
cases of moral perception are relevantly analogous to these experiences, it won't
suffice to say that the subjects of these moral experiences cannot help having
them. For instance, a utilitarian with empirical background beliefs that form a
good utilitarian justification for what the hoodlums are doing in Cat might well
not be able to help responding to it with affective empathy and revulsion or help
representing it  as wrong.55 But  my rival  explanatory schema can explain this
much. I can agree that in typical cases the simplest 'moral completion' is the
moral  representation that  we tend to  have.  In  Cat,  for  instance, the likeliest
option given the subject's background beliefs and non-moral perceptual evidence
is  that  what the hoodlums are doing is  wrong, and this is  so irrespective of
whether its wrongness is represented perceptually or otherwise. My view is also
consistent with the idea that we often cannot help experiencing things the way
we do. The kind of transition in thought to which my explanation appeals can
occur reliably as a psychologically immediate response to the relevant non-moral
inputs, and the representational state it delivers needn't be a full-blown belief.
The associated emotional or affective responses that make moral  experiences
feel so compelling also tend to be at best indirectly sensitive to other beliefs.56
(Emotional retraining, though not impossible, is often very hard.) So the view
that  representations  of  moral  properties  aren't  distinctively  perceptual  is
consistent  with  the  view  that  moral  representations  exhibit  the  kind  of
insensitivity  to  the  other  parts  of  the  subject's  cognitive  system,  such  as
conflicting background beliefs, which perceptual appearances tend to exhibit.57
53 See Bence Nanay, 'Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery', 
Philosophical Studies 150 (2010), 239–54, at 243. 
54 Various accounts of such 'amodal perception' are discussed in Nanay, op. cit. note 53. Cowan 
suggests that the phenomenon can be recruited in support of (MP); see Cowan, op. cit. note 
1, 173–5. That would require that the background cognitive states which influence what 
additional material we represent on top of lower level perceptual content cognitively 
penetrate specifically the contents of perceptual experience rather than some other aspect of 
the overall experience. But that is the issue at stake. 
55 Nor would (or should) she wish to help responding in this way – but that is another story.
56 Insofar as the proponents of (MP) take affective states to facilitate CP, they incur the same 
commitments regarding how insensitive those states are to the other parts of the subject's 
cognitive system, to what extent such insensitivity makes those states irrational, and so on.
57 I'm not (yet) convinced that the relevant moral experiences really are as insensitive to 
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So what more does this second objection require? Sometimes when we
cannot help experiencing an action as bad or wrong, we nonetheless pause to
think whether anything supports a morally charitable account of the action. On
my  account  this  would  be  to  double-check  a  psychologically  immediate
transition  in  thought.  (Compare  snap  judgments,  which  get  double-checked
fairly often even when they are fairly reliable.) According to (MP), by contrast,
we would be checking whether a perceptual appearance is illusory (much as one
might  check  the  perceptual  conditions  when  doubtful  of  one's  perceptual
appearances  regarding  color,  distance,  or  the  like).  One  might  then  wonder
whether the latter hypothesis is more compelling.
One might pursue the analogy with perceptual illusions by appealing to
examples of people who cannot help experiencing something as bad or wrong in
spite  of  having  settled  that  it  isn't  bad or  wrong and having  tried  cognitive
therapy  and  emotional  retraining.  Consider,  for  instance,  a  person  who
continues to be disgusted by homosexual affection long after having settled that
there is  nothing disgusting or immoral about such behavior.58 However,  it  is
standard to think that such cases of disgust are irrational insofar as they are
recalcitrant, and neither of the competing explanations has grounds for denying
this.  And since  each appeals  to  emotional  and affective  dispositions,  each  is
committed to a disconnect between the subjects' background moral beliefs and
their  moral  experiences.  (MP)  implies  that  if  a  property  like  being  immoral
figures in the contents of a perceptual experience of homosexual affection, it
must  have  got  there  in  some  other  way  than  cognitive  penetration  by
background  moral  beliefs  facilitated  by  suitable  emotional  or  affective
dispositions.  And  my rival  explanatory  schema implies  that  the  predominant
causal  influence  on  which  responses  are  psychologically  immediate  and
phenomenally  integrated  with  non-moral  perceptual  input  is  the  recalcitrant
disgust rather than the subject's background moral beliefs and the transitions in
thought they support. So the example of recalcitrant morally laden disgust by
itself privileges neither explanation. 
conflicting background beliefs as perceptual experiences tend to be. This is an empirical issue
that I cannot discuss here properly. But there is anecdotal evidence that moral appearances 
often respond to background beliefs. For instance, many people who used to see eating meat 
as perfectly permissible but no longer do come to represent instances of eating meat 
differently as their beliefs change. Thanks to Jacob Sparks for discussion here.
58 Thanks to Preston Werner for suggesting this example to me.
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In fact, there may be reason to prefer my hypothesis about what is going
on when we 'pause to  think'.59 When we check to  see whether  a  perceptual
appearance is illusory, we do so by making other observations, such as looking
more closely to see whether what looks like a barn is just a facade or measuring
whether the lines really are different lengths. But neither usually does the trick
in the moral case. When I cannot help experiencing something as wrong and
pause to think about it, I'll usually try to imagine the situation from a different
perspective or find (or remind myself of) some other morally relevant feature
that I may have overlooked. At least the latter doesn't look normally to happen
with perception. But if checking to see whether a moral appearance is illusory
were a matter of checking a transition in thought, one would expect it precisely
to involve scrutinizing whether the transition holds in view of a fuller range of
potentially relevant features grasped from the most apt perspective one can take.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that the phenomenology of the sort of moral experiences we have
in response to  perceptual  input  can be  well  explained without  thinking  that
moral  properties  figure  in  the  contents  of  perceptual  experience.  Treating
experiential representations of moral properties as resulting from trained implicit
transitions in thought yields a simpler and more unified explanation. But recall
that a thesis like (MP) might be motivated not only on phenomenological but
also  on epistemological  grounds.60 If  anything  gives  us  knowledge about  the
external world, perception does. So might the existence of moral perception help
us with the difficult project of developing a plausible moral epistemology?
If I'm right that phenomenal contrast arguments that rely on the cognitive
penetration of perceptual content by background moral beliefs fail to support
59 Many thanks to Jacob Sparks for suggesting the line of argument in this paragraph.
60 A third possible type of argument for (MP) is based on the metaphysics of moral properties. 
Chappell, op. cit. note 1, argues that at least some (moral) patterns are properties and at 
least some (moral) pattern recognition is perception, so there is moral perception. But the 
contrast he draws between perception and inference ignores various distinctions drawn in 
the course of my argument. Heather Logue suggests that if instantiations of some aesthetic 
properties are token-identical with their non-aesthetic base properties and we can visually 
experience the former, then we can thereby visually experience the latter; see Logue, 'Can 
We Experience Aesthetic Properties?', this volume. Whether this generalizes to moral 
properties depends partly on the issue raised in note 22: can moral properties be perceived if 
not all of the typically complex non-moral grounds of their instantiations are perceivable? 
Otherwise nothing in this paper rules out the possibility of defending (MP) on the basis of 
some controversial metaphysics of moral properties which requires independent argument.
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(MP),  then  delivering  on  the  epistemological  promises  of  (MP)  requires  a
different  kind  of  argument  for  (MP)  itself.  Such  arguments  are  yet  to  be
developed. But even setting that aside we should be cautious to ascribe (MP) any
significant epistemological benefits. Perceptual experiences of some property are
in themselves  an antidote to  skepticism only if  they provide an  epistemically
independent source  of  justification.  This  is  to  say,  roughly,  that  perceptually
representing O to be F must be able to confer epistemic justification for believing
that O is F independently of whether one has (non-perceptual) justification for
some belief B that must be justified for the belief that O is F to be justified. For
instance, memory will be an epistemically dependent source of justification if it
isn't a positive source of epistemic justification in its own right, but can only
transmit justification from non-memorial sources of justification. 
Insofar  as  moral  perception  would  involve  cognitive  penetration  of
perceptual content by background moral beliefs or emotions, moral perception
seems not to provide an epistemically independent source of justification.61 For it
seems that insofar as one's perceptual moral experiences would be sensitive to
one's  background  moral  beliefs  or  emotions,  any  justification  that  moral
perception could confer on moral beliefs would be mediated by the justification
for the relevant background states. And CP seems to abide by the 'garbage in,
garbage  out'  principle:  if  the  penetrating  cognitive  states  are  themselves
epistemically unjustified, then so would be the beliefs formed on the basis of the
perceptual  experiences  which  those  cognitive  states  penetrate.  So  perceptual
moral experience wouldn't confer justification for moral beliefs independently of
whether the relevant background states are justified. But this is just to say that
perceptual moral experience would be only an epistemically dependent source of
justification.62 So it seems reasonable to suppose that moral perceptions would
61 Here I follow Cowan's argument that (MP) doesn't provide an epistemically independent 
source of justification; see Cowan, op. cit. note 1, 187–91. After this paper was completed, a 
fuller argument has been developed in David Faraci, 'A Hard Look at Moral Perception', 
Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 2055–72. For a reply, see Preston Werner, 'Moral 
Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge', Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming). 
Note that I'm not supposing that CP as such is epistemologically problematic; compare Siegel,
op. cit. note 8, and Vance, op. cit. note 8.
62 For all I say, moral perception might not be epistemically dependent on versions of (MP) that
don't appeal to CP (see note 19). Versions of (MP) which do appeal to CP require not just 
that the moral concepts one has cognitively penetrate perceptual content, but also that some 
moral beliefs do. Mere conceptual CP isn't enough to explain why different things tend to 
strike people as wrong as background moral beliefs vary, at least in subjects whose emotional
and affective dispositions aren't significantly out of line with their background moral beliefs. 
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all be epistemically dependent. No doubt this claim needs a fuller defense. But if
it is right, then moral perception would make no independent contribution to a
plausible moral epistemology even if it did occur.
Talk of 'seeing' things to be right or wrong can still come naturally and
won't normally mislead. What we have yet to see are good reasons to think that
moral perception occurs in the literal sense of (MP). Recent arguments in the
philosophy  of  perception  for  thinking  that  various  kinds  of  higher  level
properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience aren't plausible when
applied  to  moral  properties.  Those  phenomenological  features  of  moral
experience  which  seem  to  provide  the  most  promising  kind  of  phenomenal
contrast  argument  for  (MP)  can  be  adequately  explained  without  appeal  to
(MP). Nor would (MP) seem to help us with the project of developing a plausible
moral epistemology. Moral experience is a complex and rich phenomenon with
various  features  that  I  haven't  considered  here.  So  I  cannot  rule  out  the
possibility that other arguments for (MP) might fare better. But on the present
showing doubts about the existence of moral perception look robust.63 
This strengthens the case that moral perception won't be epistemically independent insofar 
as (MP) appeals to CP.
63 Thanks to audiences at University of Leeds, the Evaluative Perception conference at 
University of Glasgow, and the Evaluative Perception workshop at Cardiff University for 
helpful discussions of this paper. Many thanks also to Anna Bergqvist, Robert Cowan, David 
Faraci, David Killoren, Heather Logue, Jacob Sparks, Preston Werner, and an anonymous 
referee for valuable written comments.
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